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L Facts
In 1982, Stanley Sanders ("Sanders") was convicted and sentenced to
death for the murder and rape of Jacqueline Lee. His conviction and death
sentence were overturned on appeal because of problems with the trial
transcript. In 1985, Sanders was re-tried and again sentenced to death. The
conviction was affirmed on appeal, but the Supreme Court of North Caroli-
na vacated the death sentence because of deficiencies in the penalty phase
jury instructions. In September 1995, ten years later, Sanders's third sen-
tencing hearing ended in a mistrial. The jurors were instructed to consider
the following four issues: (1) whether the State had proved one or more
aggravating factors; (2) whether Sanders had established the existence of any
mitigating circumstances; (3) whether the aggravating circumstances out-
weighed the existence of any mitigating circumstances; and (4) whether the
weight of the aggravating circumstances was sufficient to impose the death
penalty.'
The jury began deliberations at 10:45 a.m. and sent a note to the court
at 4:00 p.m. The note indicated that the jury had concerns about the
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court re-instruct-
ed the jury on the third and fourth issues. The jury resumed deliberations
until 5:05 p.m. When the judge brought the jury into the courtroom to
dismiss it for the evening, the judge noticed a note from the jury on top of
the materials collected. The note contained an incomplete question from
the jury. The next morning the court asked the foreman how long the jury
had been deliberating on the current issue. The foreman responded that the
jury had worked on the current issue since the previous afternoon and had
taken three votes on that issue. The court instructed the jury to continue
deliberations at 9:49 a.m. Thirty-one minutes later, the jury sent another
note to the court that read, "We have a vote of 11-1 Hung jury on the final
Issue [sic]."' The court questioned the foreman and learned that the jury
began deliberation on issue four that morning. The court sent the jury back
to continue deliberations. The jury sent yet another note to the court. This
note indicated that (1) the jury could not come to a unanimous conclusion
as to the fourth issue, (2) the jury wanted to know if a life sentence meant
1. Sanders v. Easley, 230 F.3d 679, 681 (4th Cir. 2000).
2. Id. at 682 (citingJ.A. 184).
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life in prison, and (3) one juror had conducted her own investigation and
had spoken to a judge and police officers. The court learned from the
foreman that juror Renita Lytle ("Lytle") told the jury that she had spoken
to a judge and police officers and was told that Sanders would serve at least
twenty years if sentenced to life imprisonment. After learning this, the
court considered declaring a mistrial, but defense counsel and the prosecutor
urged the court to question the juror in hopes of avoiding this result. When
questioned by the court, Lytle explained that she had lied to the other
jurors. Lytle had called her nephew, a police officer, but did not discuss the
case and did not speak to any judge. She had done this because of pressure
from the other jurors to change her vote on whether to impose death. She
also indicated to the court that she understood life in prison to mean life in
prison without parole, but that the other jurors told her that Sanders would
only serve a few months and that when he got out the other jurors hoped
Lytle or one of Lytle's family members would be Sanders's next victim.'
Based on the questioning of Lytle, the court found that it did not have
cause to cite Lytle for juror misconduct. The court instructed the jury that
parole eligibility was not relevant to the sentencing determination. The jury
was told to consider that life imprisonment meant imprisonment for life.
The jurors were told not to surrender their convictions in reaching a ver-
dict. Deliberations resumed, but another note was sent to the court twenty
minutes later.4 This note said that Lytle would not vote for the death
penalty and that she had made statements that led other jurors to think she
did not believe in the death penalty, although when pressed on the issue she
said she did believe in the death penalty. Defense counsel asked the court
to determine if the jury was still deadlocked, and if so, to impose a sentence
of life imprisonment. Counsel noted that the jury had "degenerated into
something that is much less than jury deliberations."' The prosecution
moved for a mistrial, and the court granted the motion. The court based the
mistrial on its conclusion that numerous instances of juror misconduct had
occurred prior to the expiration of a reasonable length of time to deliberate,
so that the court was required to grant a mistrial rather than impose a
sentence of life imprisonment as provided by North Carolina General
Statute Section 15A-2000(b).6
Sanders's fourth capital sentencing hearing was scheduled for March
1996. Sanders's motion to cancel the hearing on double jeopardy grounds
3. Id. at 682-84.
4. Id. at 683.
5. Id. at 683.
6. Id. at 683-84; see N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(b) (1999) ('If the jury cannot, within
a reasonable time, unanimously aree to its sentence recommendation, the judge shall impose
a sentence of life imprisonment.-).
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was denied.7 He then appealed the mistrial order and the denial of the
double jeopardy motion to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.! The
court affirmed the mistrial, holding that the conduct of the jury satisfied the
manifest necessity standard, and that the coercion of Lytle by other jurors
was sufficient, on its own, for a declaration of mistrial.9
Sanders then filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief.1" The
magistrate judge recommended denying relief and the district court followed
the recommendation of the magistrate." Sanders appealed the denial of his
habeas petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit.'2 Sanders raised the following arguments: (1) "strict scrutiny" was the
proper standard of review for his mistrial order;1 (2) the foundation upon
which the declaration of mistrial was based was insufficient;14 and (3) the
trial court acted precipitously in granting a mistrial.
15
II. Holding
The Fourth Circuit rejected Sanders's double jeopardy argument,
rejected his proposed standard of review for declarations of mistrial favor-
able to the State, and dismissed his appeal.'6
III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. Manifest Necessity Standard of Review for Mistrial Declarations
Favorable to the State
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no
person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb."' The application of the Double Jeopardy Clause generally
allows the state only one opportunity to compel a defendant to stand trial
for the same offense and gives the defendant the right not to face repeated
7. Sanders, 230 F.3d at 684.
8. Id.
9. State v. Sanders (Sanders I1), 496 S.E.2d 568, 575-77 (N.C. 1998); see Sanders, 230
F.3d at 684.
10. Sanders, 230 F.3d at 685.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 687.
14. Id. at 687-88.
15. Id. at 688.
16. Id.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Thisprovisionis made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Sanders, 230 F.3d at 685; see aso Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.




prosecutions for the same offense."5 However, there are times when retrials
are permitted.19 If a defendant acquiesces in a declaration of mistrial, the
prosecution is only barred from a retrial if it has engaged in conduct in-
tended to invoke the defendant's acquiescence.2" Under Wade v. Hunter,"1
a defendant who opposes a motion for mistrial may not be retried unless
manifest necessity requires the declaration of mistrial or if failure to grant
the mistrial would thwart the ends of justice."
The Fourth Circuit identified the manifest necessity standard and
explained that the application of that standard depends upon the facts before
the trial court.23 The court described a continuum between frivolous
requests by prosecutors in order to have additional time to prepare a case
and situations in which juries are unable to reach verdicts.24 The court
found that because the facts of each trial are unique, great deference is
afforded to the trial court's determination." The court explained that
reviewing courts have an affirmative obligation to ensure that manifest
ncessity existed to support the declaration of mistrial.26 The Fourth Circuit
further determined that the trial court's decision may be overturned on
appeal only if there was an abuse of discretion in granting the mistrial.27
. AEDPA Limits the Scope of Federal Review
Having initially discussed the general standard of review for declara-
tions of mistrial, the Fourth Circuit determined that reviewing federal
courts must apply a different standard." The Fourth Circuit held that under
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"),,9
18. Sanders, 230 F.3d at 685.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. ' 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
22. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690 (1949) (holding that defendant who opposes
mistrial may not be retried unless manifest necessity or the ends of justice require new trial).
The court in Sanders cites the opinion of Justice Story in United States v. Perez for the
proposition that, when a defendant opposes the declaration of mistrial, only manifest
necessity or the ends of justice should compel the defendant to again be tried for that offense.
Sanders, 230 F.3d at 685; see United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824) (cautioning that,
"in capital cases especially, Courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any
of the chances of life, in favour of the prisoner).
23. Sanders, 230 F.3d at 685.
24. Id. at 685-86.




29. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, S 107(a), 110
Stat. 1214, 1221 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. S 2261 (2000)).
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federal review of the decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina's
application of the manifest necessity standard was limited to deciding
whether the court's decision to uphold the mistrial was contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.- Thus, the
Fourth Circuit limited its review to an examination of whether the Supreme
Court of North Carolina had applied the manifest necessity standard of
review in a manner consistent with federal law." The Fourth Circuit
explained that its review was not an evaluation of whether the Fourth
Circuit would reach a different conclusion from the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, only whether the Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled
unreasonably in determining that manifest necessity existed."
In evaluating the reasonableness of the ruling of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, the Fourth Circuit rejected Sanders's contention that,
because retrial allows the State another opportunity to seek the death
penalty, strict scrutiny should attach to declarations of mistrial that favor
the State.3" The court noted that retrial may be barred when the prosecu-
tion acts to subvert the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. How-
ever, the court found no evidence that the prosecution had any role in the
circumstances leading to the declaration of a mistrial.'
The court next rejected Sanders's contention that the events upon
which the motion for mistrial was based were insufficient to support the
granting of the motion." Sanders argued that after each instance of juror
misconduct was brought to the attention of the court, the court instructed
the jurors not to consider the misconduct in the deliberations.' Sanders's
appeal maintained that the record did not demonstrate that jurors failed to
obey the instructions to disregard previous misconduct." The court did not
hold that any single incident alone was enough to justify a mistrial, but
30. Sanders, 230 F.3d at 686. In W'dliams v. Talor, Justice O'Connor explained in her
opinion that a state court decision is contrary to cearly established federal law if the state
court arrives at a "conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or
if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistin-
uihable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,412-13 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
holding, per Justice O'Connor, that AEDPA placed new constraint on power of federal
habeas court to grant state prisoner's application for writ of habeas corpus with respect to
claims adjudicated on merits in state court). A state court decision is an unreasonable
application of federal law "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle
from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner's case." Id.
31. Sanders, 230 F.3d at 686.
32. Id. at 686-87.
33. Id. at 687.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 688.
36. Id. at 686-88.
37. Id. at 688.
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emphasized that the pattern of misconduct in the aggregate was a reasonable
basis for the Supreme Court of North Carolina to determine that manifest
.necessity required the declaration of mistrial."
Finally, the court rejected Sanders's claim that the declaration of
mistrial was made in haste. The Fourth Circuit found that the evidence
dearly indicated the trial court's reluctance to declare a mistrial. According
to the Fourth Circuit, only after the jury had clearly lost its way did the
trial court grant the motion for mistrial.
C Application in Virginia Capital Cases
The case raises several issues for capital defendants in Virginia. One
question left unanswered by Sanders is how the provisions of the Double
Jeopardy Clause apply within the system of bifurcated capital trials.'
Sanders will face a fourth jury to determine his sentence for a capital crime
'of which he was convicted in 1985. It has been fifteen years since his
conviction and North Carolina has had four opportunities to impose the
death sentence on Stanley Sanders. The manifest necessity standard for the
declaration of mistrial gives the trial court wide discretion subject only to
the deferential "abuse of discretion" standard of review. This hands-off state
appellate review, coupled with the narrow scope of federal review under
AEDPA, raises an almost insurmountable obstacle to overturning a declara-
tion of mistrial absent actions on the part of the prosecution to precipitate
the motion for mistrial.
Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.4.E is very similar to the North
Carolina statute implicated in Sanders.42 Each statute provides that the trial
judge sball impose a sentence of life imprisonment if the jury cannot reach
a unanimous verdict. The jury in Sanders did not reach a verdict. If the
failure to reach a verdict resulted from disagreements among jurors who
conscientiously performed their duty, the result was a true hung jury. If the
jury was unable to reach a decision because juror misconduct prevented the
jury from arriving at a verdict, then it is not a hung jury. Outside the
context of capital cases, the distinction is not critical because in either case
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981) (holding that "[b]ecause the
sentencing proceeding at... trial was like the trial on the question of guilt or innocence, the
protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to one acquitted by a jury also is available
to him, with respect to the death penalty, at his retrial").
41. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4.E (Michie 2000). The Virginia Code requires that
"[In the event the jury cannot agree as to the penalty, the court shall dismiss the jury, and
impose a sentence of imprisonment for life." Id.
42. See N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(b). The North Carolina statute mandates that
"[1]f the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, unanimously agree to its sentence recommen-
dation, the judge shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment." Id.
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discharge of the jury is manifestly necessary. A mistrial will be granted and
retrial permitted. However, the distinction is critical in the context of
capital sentencing. Under the North Carolina statute (and Virginia Code
Section 19.2-264.4.E) a true hung jury requires the judge to impose a life
sentence.4 The statute alters the general rule permitting retrial after mis-
trial. The statute does not apply in the case of a jury discharged for miscon-
duct. Juror misconduct compels the judge to declare a mistrial and permits
retrial.
Defense counsel must be aware of the distinction between a discharge
for failure to agree, which is a true hung jury, and a discharge for miscon-
duct. When confronted by this situation, counsel must characterize the
result as a hung jury and convince the court to impose the sentence of life
imprisonment as required by Section 19.2-264.4.E. Characterizing the result
as a true hung jury is crucial to prevent the Commonwealth from having
another opportunity to convince a jury to return a verdict of death.
The underlying problem that led to the jury misconduct was the jury's
concern that if a sentence of life imprisonment was imposed, Sanders would
be released from prison after serving only a short time. The now mandated
"life means life" instruction for capital crimes committed on or afterJanuary
1, 1995, allows the jury to make a more informed sentencing decision." A
well-informed jury, with the knowledge that a defendant sentenced to life
imprisonment is ineligible for parole, will be less likely to engage in the type
of intimidation of non-death jurors testified to by Juror Lytle.
Matthew S. Nichols
43. See id.; VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.4.E.
44. See VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.4.A (Michie 2000) (requiring that "[Upon request
of the defendant, a jury shall be instructed that for all Class I felony offenses committed after
January 1, 1995, a defendant shall not be eligible for parole if sentenced to imprisonment for
life*); see also Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 171 (1994) (holding that when the
State introduces evidence of a capital defendant's future dangerousness the defendant is
entitled to inform the jury of the defendant's parole ineligibility); Yarbrough v. Common-
wealth, 519 S.E.2d 602, 616 (Va. 1999) (holding that in the penalty phase of a trial where the
defendant has been convicted of capital murder the trial court shall instruct the jury that the
words "imprisonment for life" mean "imprisonment for life without possibility of parole")
(internal citations omitted).
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